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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-
RIGHTS UNDER SIEGE
David A. Anderson* and Raymond P. Niro**
Messrs. Anderson and Niro survey and comment on the recent erosion
of intellectual property rights. Focusing on the area of trade secrets, the
authors point out the effective elimination of trade secret rights in the
United States Sixth Circuit. They assess developments in the law of
patents with special emphasis on the burgeoning field of computer pro-
grams, violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and the estoppel doc-
trine in class action infringement suits. They survey recent develop-
ments in copyright law focusing on the Supreme Court decision in
Goldstein v. California. The authors criticize anti-intellectual property
attitudes held by state and federal courts and warn of further erosion un-
less affirmative judicial and legislative action is taken.
That every novel idea whose realization or development can become use-
ful to society belongs primarily to him who conceived it and that it would
be a violation of the rights of man in their very essence if an industrial in-
vention were not regarded as the property of its creator.-Preamble
to the French Patent Law of 1791-
LTHOUGH the right of a creator to the possession and use of
his ideas has been considered a fundamental proposition of the
natural laws of society,' recent decisions in the intellectual
property field reflect a growing tendency to erode this right. In
the patent law, for example, the rising rate at which patents are be-
ing held invalid by the courts has prompted three of the most emi-
nent patent law professors in the nation to observe that at least one
of the judicial circuits may well have "eliminated the United States
Patent System from its law." 2
The statistics which support that observation speak for them-
selves. From January 1, 1953, when the Patent Act of 1952 be-
*Partner; Hume, Clement, Brinks, Willian, Olds & Cook; Chicago, Illinois.
** Partner, Hume, Clement, Brinks, Willian, Olds & Cook; Chicago, Illinois.
1. R. ELLIS, TRADE SECRETS 19 (1953). The absolute right of a creator to his
ideas can be traced at least as far back as the Roman Law where the master was
granted protection against third persons who corrupted his slave into betraying his
trade secrets. Schiller, Trade Secrets and the Roman Law: The Actio Servi Corrupti,
30 COLUM. L. REV. 837, 839 (1930).
2. D. DrNNER, J. GANDRELL & S. WHITE, PATENT LAw PERSPECTIVES, Develop-
ments § A.1[1] Rel. No. 3 (Feb. 1971).
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came effective, until June, 1971, the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit had occasion to decide the validity of 46 patents. Of
these, the court held 42 invalid' with only one of the 46 litigated
patents surviving a final adjudication of validity and infringement.4
It is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine a similar circumstance
occurring in the real property law. If 42 out of 46 landowners
found, after filing actions for trespass, that title to their property had
been judicially declared null and void, a suggestion that a crisis had
occurred in the law would be an understatement.
Yet, for owners of intellectual property, the high patent invalidity
rates pose only a portion of the problem they face. While it might
be regarded as mere conjecture to observe that the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit has "eliminated the United States Pat-
ent System from its law," there can be absolutely no doubt that the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has already, in fact, elimi-
nated trade secret law from its jurisprudence. In May, 1973, that
court held that the Constitution and patent laws of the United States
preempt and make ineffective state trade secret laws which prohibit
the unlawful misappropriation, disclosure and use of trade secrets.'
That decision came on the heels of five other decisions, by five
other courts of appeals, which expressly rejected the preemption
concept fashioned by the Sixth Circuit.6
Thus, the creator of intellectual property now faces a practical
dilemma that is unquestionably more real than imagined. On the
one hand, he can elect to maintain his creative efforts as a trade
secret in the hope that the Supreme Court will reverse the Sixth
3. These statistics have been compiled from the decisions reported in Federal
Reporter, Second Series. See also I. KAYTON, THE CRISIS OF LAW IN PATENTS AND
TRADE SECRETS (1970).
4. Wm. F. Crome & Co. v. Vendo Co., 299 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1962). In
June, 1971, the Eighth Circuit altered the statistics slightly by holding another patent
valid. Woodstream Corp. v. Herter's, Inc., 446 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971). But
since that time, the invalidity trend has continued. Four additional patents have
been litigated before the Eighth Circuit. Three were held invalid, and the other
held infringed, after the defendant conceded the validity question.
5. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 478 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir.), cert. granted,
42 U.S.L.W. 3194 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1973) (No. 73-187).
6. Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971); Dekar In-
dustries, Inc. v. Bissett-Berman Corp., 434 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 945 (1971); Water Services Inc. v. Tesco Chemicals, Inc., 410 F.2d 163
(5th Cir. 1969); Servo Corp. of America v. General Electric Co., 337 F.2d 716(4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 934 (1966). See also Bendix Corp. v.
Balax, Inc., 421 F.2d 809, 821 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911 (1970).
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Circuit preemption doctrine. Alternatively, he can elect to obtain
patent protection for his creative efforts, and run the risk of seek-
ing to enforce his patent, perhaps by necessity,7 in a forum that is
statistically hostile to his cause. Understandably, neither alterna-
tive can possibly offer any sense of comfort to the creator of intel-
lectual property.
It is the purpose of this survey of recent developments in the
law of intellectual propertys both to examine the apparent erosion
of intellectual property rights in this country and to suggest, where
possible, some new directions that might abate the erosion.
I. TRADE SECRETS IN LIGHT OF Kewanee
On at least two occasions in the past eight years, the Illinois Su-
preme Court has expressly recognized the common law right of an
individual to possess, use and enjoy the benefits of his trade secrets.'
The court sustained injunctions prohibiting the wrongful use of trade
secrets for periods at least as long as that required "to discover or re-
produce the information by lawful means. ' 1°  It imposed liability for
trade secret misappropriation even where the wrongful taking oc-
curred by committing the trade secrets to memory from "constant
exposure" 1' rather than through an actual taking of physical ma-
terials. Indeed, the court also sustained an injunction against the
sale of an entire device, even though the misappropriated trade se-
7. Contrary to popular belief, a patent owner does not have a high degree of
choice in selecting a forum in which to litigate his patent. As a plaintiff, in an
infringement suit, he must abide by the special venue statute for patent infringe-
ment suits, which limits the place of suit to "the judicial district where the de-
fendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and
has a regular and established business." 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1970). Yet, as a
defendant, in a declaratory judgment action for patent invalidity, the patent owner,
according to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, is subject to personal
jurisdiction by merely sending a letter threatening suit for infringement to a resi-
dent of the forum. B & J Mfg. Co. v. Solar Indus., Inc., - F.2d -, 42 U.S.L.W.
2105 (8th Cir. Aug. 28, 1973).
8. The greatest volume of cases dealing with intellectual property law are de-
cided in the federal courts. By necessity, therefore, the most significant new de-
velopments in the field, although they affect Illinois citizens, Illinois business and
Illinois case and statutory law, do not typically arise in the state courts of Illinois.
9. ILG Indus., Inc. v. Scott, 49 Ill. 2d 88, 273 N.E.2d 393 (1971); Schulen-
burg v. Signatrol, Inc., 33 Ill. 2d 379, 212 N.E.2d 865 (1965).
10. 49 Ill. 2d at 97, 273 N.E.2d at 398.
11. 33 111. 2d at 387, 212 N.E.2d at 869.
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crets related solely to select components embodied in the device. 12
While the Illinois Supreme Court has merely endorsed the com-
mon law right of ownership and use of trade secrets, the Illinois leg-
islature has enacted laws making the theft of trade secrets a crime.'"
At least twenty other state legislatures have also supplemented their
common law by enacting statutes which prohibit and criminally
punish the misappropriation of trade secrets. 14  Thus, in Illinois, as
in most other states, both the common law and the statutory law
evidence a continued recognition that trade secrets are a viable form
of intellectual property.
The extent to which that viability will continue, however, is now
in the hands of the United States Supreme Court. In May, 1973,
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held, in Kewanee Oil Co.
v. Bicron Corp.,'5 that
our analysis of the relationship between the Patent Laws of the United
States and the Trade Secret Laws of the State of Ohio, as applied in
this case, forces us to the conclusion that the field of protection afforded
to this plaintiff by that Trade Secret Law has been preempted by the
Patent Laws of the United States. We, therefore, hold that the Trade
Secret Laws of the State of Ohio may not afford to the plaintiff in this
case protection which the plaintiff could not obtain under the Patent
Laws.16
The implications of the Kewanee decision can be best understood
through a brief analysis of the factual setting in which the court fash-
ioned its preemption doctrine. Beginning in 1949, and continuing
for seventeen years thereafter, the plaintiff, Kewanee, developed a
12. 49 Ill. 2d at 95, 273 N.E.2d at 397.
13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, H8 15-1 to 15-9, 16-1 (1971).
14. ARK. STAT. ANN. H8 41-3949 to 41-3951 (Supp. 1971); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 499c (West 1972); COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-5-33 (Supp. 1969); GA. CODE § 26-
1809 (1972); IND. ANN. STAT. H3 10-3048 to 10-3052 (Supp. 1972); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2113 (Supp. 1972); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266 §H 30(4),
60A (1967); MICH. COMP. LAWS H§ 752.771 to 752.773 (Supp. 1968); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.52 (Supp. 1973); NEB. REV. STAT. H8 548.01 to 548.03 (Supp.
1972); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 580:32 (Supp. 1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:
119-5.1 to 119-5.5 (1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-16-23 (1972); N.Y. PENAL
LAWS § 155.00(6), 155.30(3), 165.07 (McKinney 1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
75.1 (1969); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §H 1333.51 to 1333.99(E) (Page 1972); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 21, § 1732 (Supp. 1972); PA. STAT. tit. 18, § 4899.2 (Supp. 1973);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 21-4238 to 21-4240 (1967); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.205
(Supp. 1973).
15. 478 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3194 (U.S. Oct. 9,
1973) (No. 73-187).
16. Id. at 1087.
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body of secret technology in the field of synthetic crystal growth.17
In the words of the court: "[i]t was an accomplishment which no
other competitor had achieved. '1 8
Each of the individual defendants was a former employee of Ke-
wanee. Each was bound by an employment contract which prohib-
ited the disclosure and use of Kewanee's trade secrets. Each also
had a particular skill in some aspect of Kewanee's secret crystal-
growing technology.' 9 While it took Kewanee over sixteen years
to perfect its crystal growth processes and manufacturing tech-
niques, the defendants, and the new company they formed, did it
in a mere nine months.2 °
Thus, the court had before it the classic trade secret case: former
employees, bound by employment contracts and having access to
their former employer's trade secrets, form a competitive enter-
prise, which accomplishes technical feats in months that required
years of effort on the part of their former employer. Even the
court itself recognized the basic impropriety of the defendants' ac-
tivities, by observing that
[tihere can be no question on this record but what these individual de-
fendants appropriated, to the benefit of Bicron, Harchaw's secrets, proc-
esses, procedures and manufacturing techniques. 2
Although the court recognized the basic impropriety of the de-
fendants' misappropriation, it seized upon two facts to support its
conclusion that the imposition of sanctions against the defendants
would be inappropriate. First, it was admitted by Kewanee that
the trade secrets may have been patentable. 22  Secondly, it was ad-
mitted that the trade secrets had been used (although secretly)




21. Id. at 1076-77. The court went on to note that were the Ohio Trade Secret
Law not preempted, it would have affirmed the judgment of the lower court. Id.
at 1077-78.
22. Id. at 1078. A patent can only be obtained on a new and useful process,
machine, manufacture or composition of matter. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970). In con-
trast, a trade secret might include non-patentable subject matter such as plans,
specifications, technical "know-how," non-technical internal business operating meth-
ods, market research studies, and lists of customers and suppliers. RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 757, comment b (1938); Schreyer v. Casco Prod. Corp., 97 F. Supp. 159,
168 (D. Conn. 1951), modified, 190 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 913 (1952).
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more than a year prior to the commencement of suit by Kewa-
nee. 23  From these two facts and a simplistic analysis of federal
patent policies, the court reasoned: (1) that Kewanee could have
sought patent protection for its trade secrets, but did not; (2) that
Kewanee was now foreclosed from seeking patent protection be-
cause of its own secret use; and (3) that Kewanee could not "exclude
competition and prevent disclosure [of its trade secrets] '24 through
application of the Ohio trade secret law, because it had lost its
right to obtain a patent for the same secret subject matter.
Although the simplicity of the court's reasoning is appealing, the
decision itself is simply wrong, both in its logic and its philosophy.
Congress, not the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit or the Su-
preme Court, enacted the patent laws. Indeed, the right of Con-
gress to enact those laws is granted directly by the Constitution2"
What better source to look to, then, in discovering the possibility
of conflict between the patent laws and the state trade secret laws,
than the actions of the Congress?
23. Id. at 1078. The patent law provides, inter alia, that a patent may not issue
on an invention which has been in public use or on sale more than one year prior
to the filing date of an application for patent. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1970).
24. Id. at 1086.
25. Art. 1, sec. 8, clause 8 of the Constitution provides: "The Congress shall
have the Power . . . . To promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts,
by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries"....
26. The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1970) prohibits
federal agency disclosure of trade secrets. The Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78x(a) (1970) prevents the SEC from seeking the disclosure of
trade secrets. The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (1970) pro-
hibits the publication of trade secrets obtained by the agency. Section 205 of the
Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (Supp. I, 1971) requires
agency respect for the integrity of trade secrets. The Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 331(j) (1970) prohibits persons from using or re-
vealing trade secrets. The Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act of 1968,
42 U.S.C. § 263i(e) (1970), which prohibits disclosure of any "information which
contains or relates to a trade secret." The Wholesome Poultry Products Act, 21
U.S.C. § 458(a)(5) (1970) prohibits use of disclosure of trade secrets by persons
acquiring such information pursuant to the Act. The Air Quality Act of 1967,
42 U.S.C. § 1857c-9(c) (1970), permits witnesses testifying at public hearings to
refuse to divulge trade secrets or secret processes. The Flammable Fabrics Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1193(c) (1970), prohibits the Secretary of Commerce from revealing
information containing or relating to trade secrets. The Clean Water Restoration
Act of 1966, 33 U.S.C. § 1160(f)(2) (1970), authorizes persons required to file
reports on water pollution to refuse to divulge "trade secrets or secret processes" in
such reports. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15
U.S.C. § 1401(e) (1970), prohibits the Secretary of Health, Education and Wel-
fare from disclosing trade secrets.
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But, the court in Kewanee neglected to even make that inquiry.
If it had, it would have found that Congress has enacted no less
than twelve laws, since the last revision of the patent laws in 1952,
that expressly recognize and protect trade secrets.2 6 Congress, for
example, has made it a federal crime for a federal employee to dis-
close a trade secret.2" It has recognized trade secrets as property sub-
ject to capital gains treatment.2 8  The definition of "stolen goods" in
the National Stolen Property Act has been interpreted to include trade
secrets.29 Congress has even empowered the Secretaries of Interior
and Health, Education and Welfare to acquire trade secrets from
others by "purchase, license, lease or donation.""0  Indeed,
the patent laws themselves provide that "[a]pplications for patents
shall be kept in confidence by the Patent Office,"' 31 so that an in-
ventor who is unsuccessful in obtaining a patent may maintain his
invention in secret. Yet, in formulating its impressions of patent
law "policies and purposes" that support a preemption theory, the
court in Kewanee overlooked the best evidence that Congress cer-
tainly intended no preemption-Congress' own numerous expressions
that patents and trade secrets are compatible.
In addition to running afoul of clear expressions of congres-
sional policy concerning trade secrets, the court in Kewanee also
failed to consider existing policies of the executive branch of the
federal government,8 2 a host of existing treaties,3 3 and even the
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970).
28. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1221-23 (1970). See E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v.
United States, 288 F.2d 904 (Ct. Cl. 1961) and Pickren v. United States, 378
F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1967).
29. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315 (1964). United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389
(2d Cir. 1966).
30. Air Quality Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C. § 1857b-l(b)(4) (1970); Act to
Develop the Commercial Fishing Industry, 16 U.S.C. § 778e(e) (1970); Act to
Provide Synthetic Liquid Fuels from Coal and Oil Shale, 30 U.S.C. § 322(b)
(1970)
31. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1970).
32. The procurement regulations of the Department of Defense and the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Agency recognize and provide for the use, acquisition
and protection of trade secrets. Armed Services Procurement Regulations, 32
C.F.R. §§ I to 30 (1973), and NASA Procurement Regulations, 14 C.F.R. § 1245
(1973).
33. The Convention of Paris, Article lobis(2), October 31, 1958, [1962] 13
U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 4931 and the General Inter-American Convention for Trade
Mark and Commercial Protection, February 20, 1929, 46 Stat. 2907, two treaties to
which the United States is a party, prohibit acts "contrary to honest practices in
1973]
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long-standing policy expressions of the Supreme Court, 4 all of which
support a conclusion that patents and trade secrets are fully com-
patible. Thus, if a meaningful criticism can be leveled at the court's
decision in Kewanee, it is that the court struck down a significant
area of intellectual property rights, without the "fully focused in-
quiry"8 suggested by the Supreme Court, and without the slight-
est appreciation for the practical consequences of its decision.
Courts could engage in a philosophical debate over the practical
significance of trade secret rights indefinitely without reaching an
accord on the exact value of trade secret rights in the United
States. But these practical implications cannot simply be ignored,
as done in Kewanee. Rather, they must be considered and weighed
before more than a century of coexistence between patents and
trade secrets is abolished.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, for example, in
Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc. 6 sensed the commercial significance
of trade secret rights in observing that;
In thousands of contracts businessmen have divulged such secrets to
competitors, dealing at arms' length and well able to protect themselves, on
industrial and commercial matters" and acts "contrary to commercial good faith or
to the normal and honorable development of industrial or business activities."
SeeBacardi Corp. of America v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 160 n.9 (1940) and
Stauffer v. Exley, 184 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1950). See also Agreements To Facilitate
The Interchange of Patent Rights and Technical Information for Defense Purposes,
Belgium, Oct. 12, 1954, [1954] 5 U.S.T. 2318, T.I.A.S. No. 3093; Denmark, Feb. 19,
1960, [1960] 11 U.S.T. 148, T.I.A.S. No. 4423; France, Mar. 12, 1957, [1957] 8
U.S.T. 353, T.I.A.S. No. 3782; Germany, Jan. 14, 1956, [1956] 7 U.S.T. 45, T.I.A.S.
No. 3478; Greece, June 16, 1955, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 2173, T.I.A.S. 3286; Italy, Oct. 3,
1952, [1961] 12 U.S.T. 189, T.I.A.S. No. 4693; Japan, Mar. 22, 1956, [1956] 7
U.S.T. 1021, T.I.A.S. No. 3585; Netherlands, April 29, 1955, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 2187,
T.I.A.S. No. 3287; Norway, April 6, 1955, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 799, T.I.A.S. No. 3226;
United Kingdom, Jan. 19, 1953, [1953] 4 U.S.T. 150, T.I.A.S. No. 2773.
34. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933); E.I. du
Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917); Dr. Miles Medi-
cal Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911); Fowle v. Park, 131
U.S. 88 (1889); Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501 (1878); Peabody v. Norfolk,
98 Mass. 452 (1868).
35. The court simply ignored Justice Harlan's admonition in Lear, Inc. v.
Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969), where the identical preemption concept was consid-
ered and rejected. There the Court refused to "define in even a limited way the
extent, if any, to which the States may properly act to enforce the contractual rights
of inventors of unpatented secret ideas." Id. at 675. Indeed, the Supreme Court
in Lear specifically recognized the "difficulty and importance" of the task and held
that it should be undertaken only after a "fully focused inquiry" by state courts.
Id.
36. 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971).
368
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the faith that mutually acceptable provisions for payment, for the preserva-
tion of confidentiality, and for the return of the secret information on
termination or default will be enforced by the courts.
The district judge cited no data to prove that licensing of trade secrets
had worked adversely to the public interest. To the contrary, such facts
as have been brought to our notice Indicate that the sharing of technolog-
ical know-how on the basis of proper agreements has been beneficial not
only within this country but in its relations with others.37
Foreign companies have expended millions of dollars in obtaining
American trade secret rights.38 Conversely, American industry
undoubtedly spends millions annually to obtain foreign technology
protected only by trade secret rights. Yet, it is hard to imagine any
continued foreign interest either in paying for access to non-existent
American trade secret rights or in licensing foreign trade secret
rights to American industry, should the Kewanee decision become
the law of the land. 9
Finally, it should be noted that the Kewanee decision is based
upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the differences between
patent and trade secret rights and the reason for their continued co-
existence under the laws of virtually all industrial nations. Con-
sistent with the tenor of the Constitution, a United States patent
grants exclusive rights for a fixed duration-the right to exclude all
others from using the invention for seventeen years. The condi-
tion precedent to obtaining this grant is the disclosure of the inven-
tion to the public.4" Disclosure, however, is not required until the
inventor accepts the patent.4
37. Id. at 225-226 (emphasis added). The court also took judicial notice of
the fact that the loss in "foreign dollar payments [to the United States] might run
as high as $1 billion annually" if trade secret rights in the United States are struck
down. Id. at 226 n.7.
38. See, e.g., Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp.,
342 F.2d 737, 744 (2d Cir. 1965), where Toyo of Japan agreed to pay approxi-
mately six million dollars for technology in the polyethylene reactor field.
39. A foreign owner of trade secret rights undoubtedly would know that an
American licensee of secret technology could not agree to maintain the requisite
element of secrecy in his commercial transactions in the United States. Indeed,
under Kewanee, the American licensee could not ever enjoin former employees
either from using or disclosing such trade secrets, even though such use or dis-
closure would injure both the foreign trade secret owner and the American licensee.
40. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966); Grant v. Raymond,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 217, 240-42 (1832).
41. While pending in the Patent Office the patent application is maintained in
secrecy. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1970). When the patent application is "allowed," the
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A trade secret, on the other hand, carries no exclusive rights. One
cannot e xclude others from using a trade secret, unless there has
been a violation of a contractual obligation or an unlawful misap-
propriation. One who learns the secret independently-whether by
accident, by independent invention or discovery, or by inspection of
the goods on the open market---cannot be excluded from use or dis-
closure of the secret. Indeed, as Mr. Justice Holmes noted in E. 1.
du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland,42 the essence of all
trade secret rights is the existence of a confidential relationship
between the trade secret owner and the alleged misappropriator.
Thus, the owner of a patent can exclude anyone from the man-
ufacture, use or sale of his patented invention-whether the infring-
ing subject matter was developed independently or not. A trade
secret owner, on the other hand, must stand on the confidential rela-
tionship between himself and the misappropriator. He has no
rights against the honest independent developer of the identical tech-
nology. Indeed, his rights extend only to those who wrongfully take
his technology and then only so long as the technology has been kept
secret and not become part of the public domain.4"
The obvious consequence of the Kewanee decision, therefore, is
that all technology that is possibly subject to patent protection can
no longer be maintained as a trade secret. For the Illinois citizen,
it means that he cannot allow at least the patentable portion of his
secret technology to be exposed to misappropriation in the Sixth
Circuit. Indeed, if his former employees begin a competitive
business enterprise in Ohio based upon his trade secrets, he cannot
hope to enjoin the disclosure or use of his trade secrets at all. The
Patent Office advises the applicant that his claims are acceptable, and the appli-
cant may then pay the final fee for issuance of the patent or decline to pay the
final fee whereupon the application is abandoned but maintained in secrecy. Rules
311-317, RULES OF PRACTICE IN PATENT CASES (1970). Thus an inventor does not
decide whether he will accept a patent, in lieu of what may be a trade secret, until
he knows the scope of his protection.
42. 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917).
43. The requirement that trade secret rights are enforceable only if the subject
matter was secret at the time of the wrongful taking fully distinguishes the Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964) cases relied upon by the court in Kewanee.
In both cases, the Supreme Court held that state unfair competition laws could
not be used to prevent one from copying that which was in the public domain.
But, by definition, a trade secret right is not enforceable if it is no longer secret.
[Vol. 23:361370
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Kewanee decision also means that the Illinois industrialist will have
to be twice as persuasive to obtain rights under foreign technology
that is subject to foreign trade secret protection because of the in-
herent risk that the foreign trade secret rights will be lost through
sanctioned misappropriation in the Sixth Circuit.
The ultimate answer to this dilemma lies with the Supreme Court.
The choice is clear. Kewanee can be affirmed and the trade secret
laws of all the States can be judicially repealed. Or alternatively,
Kewanee can be reversed, and the Sixth Circuit can be saved from
becoming a haven for trade secret misappropriation.
II. PATENT LAW
A. Computer Programs
In a tortured and poorly reasoned opinion, the Supreme Court
held in Gottschalk v. Benson" that patent protection could not be
obtained on a program for a digital computer. This subject has
given rise to great controversy in recent years, largely because of
the opposition of the Patent Office4" and the large computer manu-
facturers46 to the granting of such patents.
The opposition of the Patent Office appears to result largely
from the simple fact that it is not equipped to competently examine
applications in this field. This position received a significant boost
in 1966 from the President's Commission on the Patent System,
which came out flatly against the patenting of programs, primarily
on the basis of administrative convenience.47
44. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
45. Guidelines for Examination of Programs, 829 OFFICIAL GAZErrE (1972);
cf. Bender, Computer Programs: Should They Be Patentable?, 68 COLUM. L. REV.
241, 255-57 (1968).
46. Several large computer manufacturers have filed briefs as amici curiae in
cases before the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, opposing the
patenting of programs. In Gottschalk, amicus briefs opposing patent protection
were filed in the Supreme Court by IBM, Burroughs, Honeywell, and the Business
Equipment Manufacturers' Association. No computer manufacturers urged that
programs should be patentable.
47. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, To PRO-
MOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS IN AN AGE OF EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY 12
(1966). The Commissioner also made the unsupported statement that the crea-
tion of programs "has undergone substantial and satisfactory growth in the absence
of patent protection," and noted that "copyright protection is presently available."
The conclusion of "satisfactory growth", however, is questionable. See Bender,
Computer Programs: Should They Be Patentable? 68 COLUM. L. REV. 241 (1968).
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Despite the opposition of the Patent Office and the President's
Commission, the United States Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals (C.C.P.A.), in a series of cases,4 began reversing the Patent
Office's rejections of program applications, which were generally
based upon the position that these applications would cover unpat-
entable "mental steps" or processes that could be carried out in the
human mind.
Although the Supreme Court reversed the C.C.P.A., its opinion
is an illogical quagmire that leaves the area in doubt. Shortly after
the opinion came down, it was optimistically suggested that patents
on computer programs were "not ruled out entirely."4 It was re-
ported to one of the authors that there are even those who have in-
terpreted the opinion as a mandate for patents on computer pro-
grams. Indeed, the C.C.P.A. itself has recently reversed the rejec-
tion of a program application which defined the invention of a pro-
gram application which defined the invention as a new apparatus-
the programmed computer.50 However, the central issue of Gott-
schalk-the patentability of an invention involving "mental steps"
-was not before the C.C.P.A. in that case.
Hopefully, Congress will step in and take the necessary action to
permit the patenting of computer programs. If it does, growth in
the field is bound to increase through the increased level of infor-
mation interchange resulting from the inclusion of computer pro-
grams in the patent system. 5'
B. Patent-Antitrust
Undoubtedly, the most significant and far-reaching decision in
Furthermore, copyright protection is simply unsatisfactory; Comment, Software Pro-
tection: Patents, Copyrights, and Trade Secrets, 35 ALBANY L. REV. 695 (1971).
48. In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682 (C.C.P.A. 1971), rev'd sub nom., Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); In re Mahoney, 421 F.2d 742 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re
Bemhart, 417 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969); In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A.
1968), modified, 415 F,2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
49. Mainframe Makers Hail High Court Rule, 17 ELECTRONIC NEWS, Nov. 27,
1972, at 28.
50. In re Knowlton, - F.2d - (C.C.P.A. 1973), discussed in BNA PATENT
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT JOURNAL, No. 139, p. A-1 (Aug. 2, 1973).
51. Secrecy has already become the norm in the computer program field. See
Bender, Trade Secret Protection of Software, 83 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 909 (1970);
Comment, Software Protection: Patents, Copyrights and Trade Secrets, 35 ALBANY
L. REV. 695 (1971); "License Agreement for IBM Program Products," THE LAw
OF SOFTWARE, 1969 Proceedings, p. C-i at C-2.
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the patent-antitrust field is that of the Supreme Court in United
States v. Glaxa Group Ltd.5 2  This case involved an action un-
der section 1 of the Sherman Act5" in which the government charged
that contractual restrictions on the bulk sale and resale of a drug
called griseofulvin were an unlawful restraint of trade. These
restrictions were contained in a patent pooling agreement between
Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. (ICI) and Glaxo. The govern-
ment in a test of its right to do so, challenged the validity of the un-
derlying patents. The district court held the agreement to be a per se
violation of the Sherman Act, but struck down the challenge to val-
idity because the parties did not rely on the patents in defense of the
antitrust claim.
The Supreme Court reversed the district court, holding for the
first time that the government, in the context of an antitrust case,
may also challenge the validity of a patent under certain conditions,
regardless of whether or not the owner relies on the patent in de-
fense of an antitrust action. In taking this position, the Court ob-
served that Glaxo and ICI had opposed compulsory patent licensing
below on the grounds that such relief would "'deny defendants an
essential ingredient of their rights under the patent system,' and that
there was no warrant for such a drastic forfeiture of their
rights."54  The Court stated that this position of the defendants was
all the more reason to permit a challenge to validity:
In this context, where the court would necessarily be dealing with the
future enforceability of the patents, we think it would have been ap-
propriate, if it appeared that the Government's claims for further relief
were substantial, for the court to have also entertained the Govern-
ment's challenge to the validity of those patents.55
The Court recognized, however, that it was not giving the gov-
ernment sweeping power to challenge patent validity "of any pat-
ent lurking in the background of an antitrust case."5 6 Neverthe-
less, where the fashioning of effective relief involves a question of
patent validty, the Court stated that it could "perceive no good rea-
son, either in terms of the patent system or of judicial administra-
tion, for refusing to hear and decide it."57
52. 410 U.S. 52 (1973).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
54. 410 U.S. at 59.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 60.
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Glaxo is clear evidence of a trend marked by the Supreme Court
decisions in Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery
Chemical Corp.,3 8 in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,"' and in Blonder-Tongue
Laboratories Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation6 ° toward a
strong policy favoring the testing of the validity of patents and the
removal of invalid patents as a possible obstacle to free competition.
Although the Court requires a substantial relationship between the
validity issue and the fashioning of effective antitrust relief, patent
holders are now on notice that unlawful agreements involving pat-
ents may well expose these patents to a charge of invalidity.
C. Estoppel
In the famous case of Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. Uni-
versity of Illinois Foundation,"' the Supreme Court overruled its prior
decision in Triplett v. Lowell,62 and held that a patentee whose patent
had been held invalid could be estopped to thereafter pursue an in-
fringement against a third party. The decision was premised on a
number of factors, including economy of judicial time and the patentee
having made his own choice of forum where he was prepared to
"litigate to the finish against the defendant there involved." 6 The
Court would apparently permit the patentee to relitigate validity
only in those exceptional cases where the first court did not purport
to employ the validity standards set forth in Graham v. John Deere
Co.,64 where the Court "wholly failed to grasp the technical subject
matter and issues in suit,"65 or where "without fault of his own the
patentee was deprived of crucial evidence or witnesses in the first
litigation."66 "In the end," the Court said that the "decision will nec-
58. 382 U.S. 172 (1965). Prior to the Glaxo decision the Government had
the right to bring a suit to cancel ab initio a patent that was obtained as a result of
a fraudulent act committed on the Patent Office. See Note, Patents, Fraud and the
Antitrust Laws, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 168 (1968).
59. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
60. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
61. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
62. 297 U.S. 638 (1936).
63. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. Univ. of I11. Foundation, 402 U.S.
313, 332 (1971).
64. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).




essarily rest on the trial court's sense of justice and equity.""7
Two recent cases have shown a very strict interpretation of Blon-
der-Tongue by the lower courts in situations which would not ap-
pear to compel the application of an estoppel. In Bourns, Inc. v.
Allen-Bradley Co.,6" Bourns had filed a class infringement action
in the Northern District of Illinois. Some of the claims69 of the pat-
ent in suit had previously been held invalid by the District Court for
the District of Nebraska,"° and that decision was not appealed.
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that the
class action was completely barred by the decision of the Nebraska
Court, and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.7
On appeal, Bourns argued that an estoppel should not be ap-
plied to the claims that were not even adjudicated in the Nebraska
case, and that, for several reasons, the Nebraska judgment should
not operate as an estoppel even as to the claims that were held in-
valid. In support of the latter position, Bourns argued that it had
intentionally avoided appealing the Nebraska decision because of the
notorious invalidity record of the Eighth Circuit, 72 and because
Bourns was confident that, under the then-current decision in Trip-
lett v. Lowell 3 it would not be estopped from bringing an action
against other, more significant infringers in a more favorable forum.
Although the Seventh Circuit agreed that Bourns was not estopped
to assert infringement of the unadjudicated claims-a conclusion
that seems obviously correct-in a 2-1 decision, the court refused to
permit litigation of the claims that were held invalid in Nebraska.
As justification for this holding, the court relied on the district
court, which had observed that
appellants themselves chose the Nebraska forum; that the [Nebraska]
court applied the Supreme Court standards of patent validity as enunciated in
Graham v. John Deere Co .... ; that the [Nebraska] litigation involved a
67. Id. at 334.
68. 480 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1973).
69. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (Supp. 1972) provides that a patent application "shall con-
clude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the
subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." It is common for a
patent to contain many claims, defining the invention in various ways.
70. Bourns, Inc. v. Dale Electronics, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 501 (D. Neb. 1969).
71. Bourns, Inc. v. Allen-Bradley Co., 348 F. Supp. 554 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
72. See notes 3-4 and accompanying text, supra.
73. 297 U.S. 638 (1936).
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potential recovery by appellants of approximately $1,000,000, and that "most
if not all" of the evidence alleged by appellants to have been newly dis-
covered was in existence and discoverable during the [Nebraska] litigation. 74
This result is unfortunate, and seems not only manifestly unjust,
but also inconsistent with the Supreme Court's own decision in
Blonder-Tongue, where an incentive to "litigate to the finish" in the
first case was considered an overriding factor. In Bourns, there
clearly was no such incentive where the appellant could rely on the
earlier doctrine of Triplett, and could sue other defendants else-
where while avoiding certain affirmance of its defeat in the Eighth
Circuit. As lucidly pointed out in the dissenting opinion of Judge
Pell, Bourns had every reason to rely on the established precedent
of the Supreme Court in Triplett in ordering its affairs.
Perhaps an even morely clearly unjust result was reached in the
name of Blonder-Tongue by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in the case of Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., Inc."5
That case involved a patent that had previously been held valid by
the United States Court of Claims76 and by the United States
District Court for South Carolina.77 The South Carolina decision was
reversed, however, by the Fourth Circuit,7 8 and the Supreme Court
denied certiorari.79
The district judge in Kawneer initially refused to grant summary
judgment for the defendant on the basis of Blonder-Tongue, stat-
ing:
In the interest of justice, this court cannot place more weight on the de-
cision of the Court of Appeals than on the decision of the Court of Claims
in ruling on the defendants' plea for estoppel.80
The district court finally relented,8 however, in the face of the per
74. 480 F.2d at 125.
75. - F.2d at -, 178 U.S.P.Q. 513 (5th Cir. 1973).
76. Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. United States, 372 F.2d 1014 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
77. Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Citizens and Southern National Bank of South
Carolina, 286 F. Supp. 448 (D.S.C. 1968).
78. Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Citizens and Southern National Bank of South
Carolina, 407 F.2d 557 (4th Cir. 1969).
79. Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Citizens and Southern National Bank of South
Carolina, 395 U.S. 961, rehearing denied, 396 U.S. 870, 949 (1969).
80. Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., Inc., 341 F. Supp. 1018, 1021
(N.D. Ga. 1971).




curiam affirmance of a decision on the same patent in the District
of Kansas, holding the estoppel to be applicable.8 2
In holding that the estoppel applies even after a holding of valid-
ity, the Fifth Circuit bluntly stated that
Blonder-Tongue did not throw merely a jab at the multiplicity of patent
litigation; rather, it intended a knockout blow through the doctrine of
collateral estoppel so that any time a patent was found invalid in a fair
fight, the courts could count ten and the patent holder could no longer
maintain that he was champion.8 3
While appropriate to the result, the analogy of patent litigation to a
prize fight where only one side can score a knockout hardly seems
consistent with the Supreme Court's direction in Blonder-Tongue
that the court's "sense of justice and equity" should prevail.
It has been suggested that the way to avoid the obvious unfair-
ness of this situation is for a patentee to file a single class action
against all infringers, so that he need only put his patent on the line
once. While this may seem an attractive alternative, courts have
recently begun to show an increasing reluctance to entertain class
actions in patent cases."' It therefore appears that patentees will be
required with increasing frequency to expose their patents to hold-
ings of invalidity in multiple lawsuits with the knowledge that
one such holding will totally destroy their property rights.
Ill. COPYRIGHTS
The right of Congress to enact federal copyright laws is provided
by the same clause of the Constitution applicable to patents s5 as
is the case for the patent laws, Congress has enacted federal copy-
82. Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Architectural Art Mfg., Inc., 337 F. Supp. 853
(D. Kan. 1972), a!f'd per curiam, 459 F.2d 482 (10th Cir. 1972). Even in re-
versing itself, the district court refused to concede that its earlier analysis of
Blonder-Tongue was incorrect.
83. 178 U.S.P.Q. at 518.
84. See Sperberg v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 178 U.S.P.Q. 556 (N.D.
Ohio 1973); Tracor, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 176 U.S.P.Q. 505 (N.D. Ill.
1973); In re Yam Processing Patent Litigation, 175 U.S.P.Q. 645 (S.D. Fla. 1972);
Technitrol, Inc. v. Control Data Corp., 164 U.S.P.Q. 552 (D. Md. 1970). But see
Dale Electronics, Inc. v. R.C. Electronics, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531 (D.N.H. 1971);
Research Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. Ill.
1969); Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Electronics, Inc., 285 F.
Supp. 714 (N.D. 111. 1968).
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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right laws which provide for authors exclusive rights to their writ-
ings for a limited period of time.
Unlike the patent laws, however, the copyright statute expressly
preserves the authors common law right of first publication. Sec-
tion 2 of the Copyright Act 6 provides:
Nothing in this title shall be construed to annul or limit the right of
the author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or in
equity, to prevent the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished
work without his consent, and to obtain damages therefor.87
Until recently, there was little question in any of the courts that
the individual states had the right to preserve and protect the com-
mon law right of an author to be the first to publish his literary
work. Indeed, the question of statutory or constitutional preemp-
tion was seldom, if ever, raised.8"
Recently, however, in Goldstein v. California,8" the preemption
question was considered and rejected by the Supreme Court. In
that case, the Court was confronted with a direct attack on the con-
stitutionality of a California tape piracy statute9" which made it a
crime to "pirate" the recordings produced by others.
The constitutional attack was made on two grounds. First, it
was contended that the California statute established a state copy-
right law of unlimited duration, and thus conflicted with article 1,
section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution-constitutional preemption.
Secondly, it was argued that the California statute interfered
with the federal policies inherent in the federal copyright laws-
statutory preemption. Both arguments were rejected by the Court.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Court's decision in
Goldstein is the outright rejection of the constitutional preemption
doctrine. In this regard the Court observed that:
86. 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
87. Id. The common law patent counterpart to the right of first publication in
the copyright law is the right of an inventor to maintain his invention as a trade
secret. Unfortunately, Congress has never chosen to preserve the common trade
secret right in express terms in the patent laws.
88. In Edgar H. Wood Associates, Inc. v. Skene, 347 Mass. 351, 197 N.E.2d 886
(1964), the notion that state protection extended through common law copyright
was preempted by the federal copyright laws or by the constitution was summarily
rejected.
89. 41 U.S.L.W. 4829 (U.S. June 19, 1973) (No. 71-192).
90. CAL. PENAL CODE § 653h (West 1972).
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Although the copyright clause thus recognizes the potential benefits of a
national system, it does not indicate that all writings are of national in-
interest or that state legislation is, in all cases, unnecessary or precluded.9 1
Undoubtedly, the express rejection of the constitutional preemption
doctrine in Goldstein should be of assistance to the Court in re-
solving the identical issue (in a patent-trade secret context) in
Kewanee.92
At the same time, the Court in Goldstein held that Congress and
the states had "concurrent" power to act in the copyright field,
and thus rejected the statutory preemption argument urged by the
petitioners as well. The most troublesome aspect of the Goldstein
decision, from the standpoint of a reversal of Kewanee, is that the
Court premised its finding of no statutory preemption on the under-
standing that a conflict would indeed exist "if a State attempted to
protect . . . that which Congress had protected." ' Since the court
in Kewanee limited its application of the preemption, doctrine to
trade secrets that could arguably have been the subject of patent
protection, the Goldstein decision may well be distinguishable, at
least in its literal holding, from Kewanee.
While Goldstein expressly preserves the continuing right of the
states to protect common law copyrights and to enact legislation
prohibiting tape piracy, the decision may well be of limited prece-
dential value in urging the reversal of Kewanee in the trade secret
area.
As one Illinois appellate court has noted, Illinois state courts have
not been an extensive forum for the litigation of matters relating to
common law copyrights.94 Until the recent decision in Roberts
v. Dahl,95 no significant authority in the common law copyright
field existed in Illinois.
91. 41 U.S.L.W. at 4832.
92. It should be noted, however, that the Kewanee case presents a much more
difficult problem than Goldstein. In Goldstein, the Court seemed to premise its
non-constitutional preemption holding on the fact that the federal copyright laws
did not encompass the activity prohibited by the California statute. In contrast,
the court in Kewanee expressly limited its preemption ruling to subject matter
within the scope of the patent laws, i.e., subject to patent protection.
93. 41 U.S.L.W. at 4833.
94. Roberts v. Dahl, 6 Ill. App. 3d 395, 401, 286 N.E.2d 51, 55 (1972).
95. 6 I11. App. 3d 395, 286 N.E.2d 51.
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In that case, the appellate court sustained the entry of summary
judgment against an alleged owner of a common law copyright on
the ground that the alleged proprietary material had been "indepen-
dently developed" by persons other than the plaintiff.96 As is the
case for trade secrets, an action for common law copyright misap-
propriation is dependent upon the actual copying or misappropri-
ation of the efforts of another. 97 The mere fact that two conflict-
ing works are similar is not alone sufficient to establish liability. Rath-
er, as the court correctly held in Dahl, even exact identity between
two materials is not sufficient to establish plagiarism so long as the
conflicting materials were developed independently. 8
The Dahl decision correctly recognizes the existence of common
law rights in unpublished literary property. Moreover, the Dahl
decision further recognizes that a right of action exists for misap-
propriation of unpublished literary property. But, at the same
time, the court in Dahl correctly recognized that "independent de-
velopment" is a complete defense to a charge of common law copy-
right misappropriation, and that summary judgment is entirely ap-
propriate where uncontradicted evidence of "independent develop-
ment" exists in the record.
IV. CONCLUSION
Recent developments in the field of intellectual property have
consisted, by and large, of a further erosion of the rights of the cre-
ator of such property. The Sixth Circuit has flatly invalidated all
of its trade secret laws. One entire area of technology-computer
programs-has been read out of the patent system. A patentee
must engage in a veritable game of chance, sometimes against the
overwhelming odds of an unfavorable circuit, in order to enforce his
patent. These odds worsen if he must sue multiple defendants in
different circuits, where one holding of invalidity estops him from
further litigation. While a class action provides a vehicle for im-
proving these odds, courts are becoming more reluctant to entertain
this sort of action in patent cases.
96. 6 111. App. 3d at 402, 286 N.E.2d at 55.
97. Id.
98. Id. See also O'Rourke v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures Inc., 44 F. Supp. 480, 482
(D. Mass. 1942).
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Truly, the area of intellectual property is one of rights in siege.
Unless the Supreme Court takes firm action to correct the chaos in the
lower courts-a decidedly unlikely occurrence-only a thorough
review by Congress of the laws in this area can provide relief from
the uncertainty facing the owner of intellectual property. 9
99. Ironically, it is only in the area of the Copyright Laws that basic revision
is presently under review. S. 1361, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). This is the one
area of intellectual property law that has been relatively free of turmoil.
